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IN THE SUPRH~E CX>URT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALEX GEORGE, d/b/a 
HIUH COUNTRY CLUB, 
v. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
H. S. PETERSON, d/b/a ) 
HIGH COUNTRY INN RESTAURANT, ) 
d/b/a PETERSON REALTY caAPANY,) 
) 
Defendant and ) 
Respondent. ) 
----------------------------~) 
CASE NO. 18 2 8 5 
STAT.El\1ENT OF THE KIND CASE 
This was an action brought by the Appellant for the 
infringement of the trade name of High Country Club, wherein 
Appellant was conducting a club and restaurant operation, 
which was duly 1 i censed and a certificate issued by the 
Secretary of State as a d/b/a in 1977. 
The trade name was infringed upon by the Respondent, 
through his use of the name High Country Inn Restaurant in a 
restaurant business located closely adjacent to that of the 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 1 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
-~------------------------~-
The District Court, in the decision rendered 
February 3, 1982, held that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to any protection of his trade name, and had failed in his 
burden of proof, and dismissed the Complaint, awarding costs 
to the Respondent. (R 44) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Court's decision, 
and finding of no cause of action, and requests that the 
Court reverse and grant damages in the amount prayed for in 
the Complaint of the Appellant, and a permanent injunction 
against further use of the name by Respondent due to the 
unauthorized use of Plaintiff and Appellant's trade name, or 
one deceptively similar, by Respondent. 
STAT.El\1ENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant filed an Application for reservation of a 
fictitious name or d/b/a for the purpose of doing business 
on January 7, 1977. Subsequently the name was accepted by 
the State of Utah and registered for his exclusive use, as 
"High Country Club". A Certificate for doing business under 
an assumed name was, as a result, issued by the Lt. 
Governor/Secretary of State dated January 7, 1977 to the 
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Appellant. The business was immediately thereafter opened 
and operated and did continued to do business as a tavern 
and restaurant business in the Northeastern part of Weber 
County, State of Utah. 
The Respondent, with full knowledge of the operation of 
the business, the manager being intimately acquainted with 
the Appellant, and Appellant's use of the name of High 
Country Club, commenced the construction of a business and 
the operation of an inn and later a restaurant business in 
1980, in the same area in Weber County, State of Utah, and 
did solicit business and trade from the same clientele, 
which was primarily residents of the surrounding area and 
the same approximate location in Northeastern Weber County. 
Both did particularly rely upon trade from the I .R.S. and 
D.D.O. establishments for their business, both being in the 
same proximity to West Twelfth Street in Ogden, Utah; and 
did rely upon these employees and other commercial 
industries operating in the same area of Weber County. 
The location of the places of business of the two 
parties involved was that of the Appellant, located at 772 
Wall Avenue, in Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, and the 
place of the Respondent's business being at 1307 West 
Twelfth Street in Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 3 
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Both the Appellant and Respondent operate restaurant 
businesses catering to the general public and offering group 
and banquet dining facilities and food services, as well as 
those for individuals or small groups. 
That the Respondent, as a result of the opening of the 
Restaurant and Inn by the Respondent, some three (3) years 
following the opening of Appellant's operation for the same 
purpose, has created a loss of trade, loss of business and 
profits, and confusion in the trade of the Appellant, by the 
offering of the sale of food and beverages by two businesses 
operating in the same general area and catering to the same 
general trade, and by the Respondent intentionally using the 
name of one similar in nature to that of the Appellant. 
Despite the objection and notice of the objection to 
the Respondent, that the Respondent cease and desist from 
using a name similar to that of the Appellant, the Respon-
dent continued to use the name, and is continuing to do so 
to this date. 
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ARGUl\'1ENT 
POINT I. 
A- BUSINESS ENTITY, WHICH HAS BUILT UP BUSINESS AND 
CLIENTELE UNDER ITS NAME, WHICH INCLUDES A 
DESCRIPTIVE GEOGRAPHICAL TERM:, IS ENTITLED TO 
ENJOIN A NEW CCI\1PANY FRO/I ENGAGING IN THE SAME 
BUS I NESS IN THE SAME LOCALITY UNDER A NAlVIE SO 
S IIVIILAR THAT REASONABLY INTELLIGENT AND CAREFUL 
CUSTOVIERS WILL NATURALLY BE MISLED, AND IT IS NOT 
NECESSARY THAT AN INTENT TO DEFRAUD SHALL EXIST. 
~.!.!..!~~om~~~~' 133 P.2d, 542, the Court found specifically 
that: 
There seems to be a conflict of 
authority as to whether, in order that 
the use of a geographical name may be 
enjoined on the ground of unfair compe-
tition, an actual intent ion to defraud 
must be shown ... Doubtless in many 
particular instances an injunction might 
well be awarded or refused according to 
whether an intentional wrong has been 
done. But we do not think it should be 
said broadly that proof of intentional 
fraud is essential to the granting of 
such relief. While the existence of a 
wrongful intent might justify the inter-
ference of a court of equity upon a less 
showing of injury than would otherwise 
be required, the absence of such speci-
fic intent ought not to stay the hand of 
the court where a name is adopted so 
similar to that already in use by a 
business rival that injury to the first 
user will obviously and inevitably 
result. 
Thus, it is obvious that there is no requisite of proof 
of fraud or wrongful intent in order to have the use of an 
identical or similar name enjoined by a junior appropriator. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 5 
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And in the instant case, the decision by the trial court 
that there was no proof to entitle Appellant to relief is 
obvious 1 y erroneous in view of the reasoning of the above 
cited case. Particularly, where the business name of the 
Respondent is so similar to that of the Appellant as to 
1 i kely deceive a person of ordinary int e 11 igence, in the 
exercise of usual care in dealing with the Respondent. The 
The degree to which the similarity of 
names will naturally tend to deceive a 
reasonably intelligent and careful 
person. is undoubtedly the vital question 
on which the controversy turns. That 
question, however, is essentially one of 
law rather than fact. It cannot be 
conclusively determined by evidence of 
whether confusion has or has not 
resulted, just as the actual conduct of 
individuals is not proof of what consti-
tutes reasonable diligence. 
The Court, in viewing the methods for determining just 
such a question, referred to Nims on Unfair Business 
~om,e~!.:!.!.:!.~E' who, in turn, referred to a rule of the House 
of Lords, which expressly states: 
That no witness is entitled to express 
an opinion as to this. The names may be 
put in evidence, together with the facts 
as to their use, and the circumstances 
surrounding the choosing of them; but 
there is no standard, except what the 
court in each particular case believes 
has worked fraud, or may work fraud or 
loss to the plaintiff. The probability 
of injury resulting from the use of the 
two names is the test to be applied by 
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the court for the purpose of deciding 
whether or not the names will conflict. 
The actual fact of injury is amply demonstrated in the 
instant case by the numerous calls received by the Appellant 
at tempting to set up banquets in which food was prepared, 
but at which no parties ever appeared, and the food was left 
unused and had to be thrown away. (R. 88-92) 
went on further to note that: 
A distinction must be recognized between 
different geographical terms, according 
to their descriptive quality, the 
desirability of their use, and their 
connection with the subject to which 
they are applied. . . If the defendant 
had imitated the plaintiff's brands, or 
taken other steps likely to increase the 
confusion between the two names, relief 
could be granted. 
The Court 
In the instant case, the Respondent has sought not only 
to appropriate a similar, if not identical name, but has 
also sought to copy the very symbols on the signs which are 
used by the Appellant, which further adds to and increases 
the confusion. 
3 21' 128 N.W. 288, the operation of the Northwestern 
~ni!~~~~ ~.!...!_!, ~UP!~' located at Duluth was enjoined because 
of interference with the business of the Northwestern Knit-
ting Company, Minneapolis. Even though the use of the word 
"Northwestern" like that of "World" "Sun" or "American" is 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 7 
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so indefinite, that its use could readily be applied in many 
sections of the country, if not the world. 
In fad~!..:. ~ch~.!..!.!' 19 R.I. 193, 32 A.915, the prior 
user of the words "United States" as a part of the style of 
a dental office was protected by injunction against their 
similar use by a competitor, even though the phrase was so 
broad that it. clearly was not descriptive in any normal 
sense. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Richard v. Ca ton 
2~.!.~~~' 88 Minn. 242, 92 N.W. 958, forbade a new institu-
tion having another and entirely different name, to describe 
i t s el f in i t s adve rt i s i ng ma t t er as Mi nne sot a Schoo 1 of 
Business, the court feeling that this, in fact, imitated the 
name of an older school known as the 'Minnesota School of 
Business"· 
In the instant case, the use of the term High Country 
Inn, not only is deceptively similar to Appellant's use of 
the name High Country Club, but both parties also seek to 
use the name restaurant after their respective appellations, 
which without doubt, leads to confusion and loss of business 
and customers. 
In the case of ~hi.!.!!E~ !..:. !he Qov~!~£! ! _2omE~~~ £! 
~d v ~~!~!~!~ £! ~!!B:!~~~ ! r a ~_!.~g _!. n t £ !!U d ~£~~~ ~a y , 7 9 F • 2 d , 
971, the Respondent attempted to deny Appellant's cause of 
action because of the fact that Hudson's Bay had a geograph-
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ical denotation and was therefore not entitled to exclusive 
use, and for that reason there could be no unfair 
competition. However, the Court in that case referred to 
Case ~om~~~~' 1979 U.S. 665, which held: 
In other words, the manufacturer of par-
ticular goods is entitled to the reputa-
tion they have acquired, and the public 
is entitled to the means of distinguish-
ing between those and other goods; and 
protection is accorded against unfair 
dealing, whether there be a technical 
trademark or not. The essence of the 
wrong consists in the sale of the goods 
of one manufacturer or vendor for those 
of another. 
The parties in that case both sought to name their pro-
duct after the particular city in which they are manu-
factured, and the Court did hold that the prior appropriator 
was entitled to protection against subsequent appropriation 
of that name, stating: 
It abundantly appears that plaintiff's 
name has acquired a secondary signifi-
cance in the kind and quality of its 
goods, and therefore it has no objection 
to the issuance of an injunction that 
its name is geographical. 
The Respondent, in the ~hi.!..!.E~ case, also sought to 
distinguish the use of Hudson's Bay as a mere descriptive 
term, stating that there were cities named Hudson, Hudson 
Falls, the Hudson River, a car, different types of fur 
' 
which bore the name Hudson Bay, but the Court replied: 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 9 
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Where such words or names, by long use, 
have become id en t i f i ed in the minds of 
the public with the goods or business of 
a particular trader, it is unfair compe-
tition for a subsequent trader to use 
them in connection with similar goods or 
business in such a manner as to deceive 
the public and pass off his goods or 
business for that of his rival. 
Appellant had, for a long time, operated a private club 
and developed a certain class and group of customers and 
clientele in which the name High Country Club had become 
identified and the type of food which he served, which was a 
Greek specialty, separate and apart from that of any normal 
restaurant. The Court, in ~hi_!.!_;e~, ~UP_!:~, held that there 
was more than sufficient grounds to grant relief to the 
Appellant stating that: 
With respect to this contention it is 
sufficient to say that since Respon-
dent's assumed name has been identified 
in the minds of the public with the 
business of plaintiff, the fact that the 
name is descriptive will not prevent the 
relief asked. 
Here there appears to be a duration of three years time 
in which the Appellant had operated a ~estaurant business 
and which the public had come to identify the name High 
Country Club with the particular type of food served by the 
Appellant, and it had developed to the point where groups 
from the Internal Revenue Service and Defense Depot of Ogden 
had, on a regular basis, set up banquets and awards cere-
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monies at his place of business because of their appreci-
ation of the particular type of food which is served there. 
In the ~hi!lE~ case, the Court found that the law, with 
respect to trade names, permits a more liberal application 
of a remedy by injuction in cases of unfair competition, 
than does the law in cases involving infringement of trade-
marks, and any strict rules or reasoning to be applied in 
cases strictly involving trademarks are not persuasive here. 
The Court states: 
We are not here called upon to determine 
the validity of a trademark, but only 
whether or not there is unfair compe-
tition in the use of trade names. 
In the case of 2£E!!E~~!~! ~ap~! ! ~ag 2orpo!~!£E y~ 
~ac~~£E~!!!~ ~ap~! ~ome~~~ 165 S. 216, the Court held that 
there were numerous exceptions to any rule regarding exclu-
sive use of a geographical name, particularly where such 
designation was arbitrarily or fancifully created, and where 
the name has acquired a secondary meaning and signify the 
monuments. The Court, in that case, expresses its reasoning 
as follows: 
But where the manufacturer or dealer has 
adopted and acquired the right to use, 
as a trade name, a combination of words 
which indicates his place of business 
and also is descriptive of his product, 
if another, although engaged in the same 
1 i ne of business in the same town, and 
having the right to use the same words 
to indicate his location and the nature 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 11 
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of his business, thereafter combines 
such words into a trade name for himself 
which is, in form, so nearly like that 
previously adopted by his competitor as 
to mislead the public, it constitutes 
unfair competition. While his compet-
itor cannot acquired the exclusive right 
to use the name of the town in which 
both do business, nor the exclusive 
right to use the descriptive words ordi-
narily used to indicate the nature of 
such business, yet, if the one second in 
point of time desires to incorporate 
such words in his own trade name, he 
must use them in such form, or combine 
them with other words in such manner, 
that his trade name will be fairly dis-
tinguishable from that of his 
competitor. He is not permitted to 
simulate the prior trade name to such an 
extent that purchasers wi 11 be led to 
deal with him under the belief that they 
are dealing with his competitor. 
This reasoning is directly on point with the facts of 
the instant case, in that the simulation of Appellant's 
trade name has led to confusion on the part of customers 
that are, in fact, dealing with the Appellant, -When they 
are, in fact, dealing with the Respondent, High Country Inn 
Restaurant. Or they cal 1 up and place orders with 
Appe 11 ant's High Country Club for banquets and ceremonies, 
when, in fact, it is their desire to arrange for such a 
meeting at the Respondent's High County Inn Restaurant's 
banquet center. 
Thus, it can be seen that strict or technical interpre-
tations with regard to geographical names which may be 
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applied to trademark are not, in fact, applicable to trade 
names. This is particularly true for customers who are used 
to dealing with the prior appropriator of the name and are, 
in fact, confused and led to deal mistakenly with the junior 
appropriator, causing loss of business and making it diffult 
for the prior appropriator to advertise or, in fact, con-
tinue his business with any degree of profitability. 
Thus, it appears the decision of the lower Court was 
clearly erroneous in its application of law, and in any 
reliance upon the memorandum of Respondent, which cites no 
case authority whatsoever in support of his position, and 
is, in fact, contrary to the large body of case authority 
relating to use of trade names in unfair competition as 
defined by the common law of this country. 
POINT II. 
THE COURTS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT DIVERSION OF 
TRADE AND LOSS OF SALES, IN ADDITION TO 
DAMAGE TO REPUTATION AND GOOD WILL, EXPANSION 
OF BUSINESS AND DILUTION OF TRADE NAME 
AMOUNTS TO UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND IS THE BASIS 
FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTION As APPROPRIATE 
RELIEF. 
The courts have long ago adopted a broad rule of 
protection for the mark or name of a business which is in 
any way distinctive, arbitrary, strange, fanciful, original 
or otherwise, when there are competing parties adopting the 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 13 
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same name. §we~.!_~ 2ome~!!~ !.!. §we~ _ _!! §hoE..!. .!_nc.!., (CA8 
Utah) 15 F.2d 920. The rationale upon which the courts have 
allowed a cause of action for use of another parties trade 
name is predicated upon the fact that the use by the 
infringer results in a confusion of source on the part of 
the customers perspective or actual. Chemical of 
America v. (CA5 Fla) 306 F. 2d 433. 
This confusion is readily apparent in the instant case and 
was testified to at great length by Mr. Alex George at the 
t i me o f t r i a 1 • Reference was made to a number of large 
banquets involving many thousands of dollars in expense in 
food preparation, which never ma teri a 1 i zed due to the con-
fusion and similarity of the names. (R 88-92) 
The relief granted by courts for infringement of a 
trade name has included injunctive relief, particularly 
where the products are related and merchandized through the 
same channels, and confusion is likely or inevitable. The 
courts have recognized that another party using a trade name 
of one who has registered the name with the state creates an 
impression that the registered party has sponsored or 
approved, or is in some way connected with the activities of 
the one infringing that name, or that the latter is affili-
ated with or a part or branch of the former. 
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A junior appropriator of another's trade name must in 
fact demonstrate to the court that the appropriator's use 
may be entirely too remote to occasion any conceiveable 
injury, or that the mark is nondescript so as to dilute its 
selling power, or that the second user has used a mark for 
many years and developed a good will of his own before any 
conflict occurs, and in addition that there be an honest 
commercial need for his use of the term. One of the major 
concerns of the courts has been that the one who has first 
obtained approval from the state to use a registered name, 
should be permitted to develop his present business free 
from any stain or tarnishment, which may result from 
improper trade practices of the junior user. Avon Shoe 
2om~~El v . Q av!~ 2 ry ~.!.~!.!.. ! n c ~ , (CA 2 NY) 2 7 9 F . 2d 6 0 7 . 
In this case, there was testimony from Mr. George that 
in fact many deliveries of inventory and other goods were 
made to his establishment due to the confusion in the names, 
and it may very well result in the future that failure to 
pay for any goods or inventory on the p~rt of High Country 
Inn would become a blot on the credit and goodwill of High 
Country Club and Restaurant, and damage result therefrom. 
(R 85-86) 
In addition, the courts have awarded damages based upon 
injury to the complaining party's reputation and goodwill, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 15 
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the necessary limitation on the normal expansion of his 
business, or the whittling away or dilution of a trade name, 
resulting in unjust enrichment to the unlawful appropriater. 
v. White House Milk (CA2 NY) 132 
F.2d 822. 
Another theory of relief is that of giving a false 
impression of a trade connection between the parties, 
possibly subjecting the first appropriator to liability or 
to the embarrassment of litigation. This may result in 
damage to the registered parties credit reputation, and the 
possible risk of defending suits, which were in fact 
intended to be brought against the other appropriator. 
( DC Pa) 2 0 F . Supp . 7 0 3 . In fact, one widely express~d view 
is that there should be no absolute distinction between 
coined and colloquial names in use, but that the rinly issue 
is whether the defendant's use of the complaining party's 
mark, name or symbols result in a confusion as to the source 
or origin of the goods or services invol~ed. 
The right of an owner of a trade name to complain of 
the use thereof by another is ordinarily dependent upon the 
existence of some similarity, connection or relation between 
the goods, services or businesses involved, and with respect 
to their kind or character. I n th i s ca s e , the App e 1 1 ant , 
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Alex George, had opened and operated a private club, which 
necessarily by state law requires the offering of food and 
restaurant facilities in addition to the serving of liquor 
in the year 1977, immediately fol lowing the issuance of a 
certicate by the Secretary of State's Office. It is obvious 
from the testimony that he did continue to operate a busi-
ness, a major portion of which was the preparation and sale 
of food to customers, particularly employees of the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Defense Depot of Ogden, and that the 
Respondent, High Country Inn, was at all times aware of that 
fact. (R 159-162) 
Some courts have discussed the requirement of bad faith 
on the part of the subsequent appropriator, and in fact, a 
fraudulent intent ion or bad faith has been inferred where 
the junior appropriator has knowledge of the complaining 
parties trade name and symbo 1 s, and nevertheless de 1 i ber-
a t e 1 y cop i es or i mi t at es such mark , name or s ymb o 1 s . Aunt 
~em~~~~.!..!.!~ Co. !~ ~ig~~~ ! ~~' (CA2) 247 F.407. In this 
case, there is ample testimony to the effect that the trade 
name and type of business conducted by High Country Inn and 
Restaurant is in fact identical, and that exhibits which are 
in the records, specifically show that the names and signs 
are quite similar, if not, in fact, identical. Addition-
ally, the courts have found that the innocent adoption by a 
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junior user of the party's trademark is no defense, if such 
user has been guilty of progressive encroachment upon the 
rights of the senior user. !~~~E~E~~~! ~ail ~ ~ac~!~g Co. 
v. §tr~~gh~l~ §er~~ ~ro~~£!~~ !nc~, (CA7 Ill) 205 F.2d 921. 
In this case, the evidence and testimony regarding 
confusion on the part of clientele to which both of the 
establishments cater, demonstrates an increasing encroach-
ment upon the business of the High Country Club, particu-
larly with regard to the employees of Defense Depot of Ogden 
and Internal Revenue Services who were the principal cus-
tomers of the High Country Club in the past, and who had on 
occasion mistakenly called and set up banquets with the High 
County Inn and Restaurant, when in reality what they were 
seeking to do was to arrange the same banquet with the High 
Country Club. 
It has been suggested that at least in the absence of 
Legislation to the contrary, state lines delimit the extent 
of trade name protection as an appropriate division of trade 
territory. In the common 1 aw of each state it has been 
presumed to be true that if a name has been used and given a 
reputation, the fact that no business has been done in a 
particular city is immaterial, particularly where a state 
statute provided for the registration of trade names. 
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F.2d 470. In this case, the damage is even more apparent 
because of the fact that the parties are operating in close 
proximity to each other within the boundaries of a smal I 
city, and depend for the most part upon the same clientele, 
specifically government employees. 
A major case dealing with infringement of trade names 
was one which was dee ided by the District Court for the 
District of Utah in 1926. ~we~! ~ix!~~~ 2ompan~ ~~ §wee!_l~ 
§ho£~ Inc~, ~UP!~· In that case the facts are quite similar 
to those of the present case with regard to the use of a 
registered name, in that one business was named Sweet 
Sixteen Company, while the other was named Sweet 16 Shop, 
Inc. And in the present case the names are also substan 
tially similar or identical, one being High Country Club and 
the being the High Country Inn, both now adding restaurant 
a f t er the name t o denote dining fa c i 1 i t i es • A 1 so , in that 
case, suit was brought for infringement of the plaintiff's 
trade name, and the trial court finding for the defendant 
was reversed by the court of appeals. The sole question 
presented upon appeal, was the same as that found in the 
present case, where "the facts shown by the evidence are 
practically undisputed, the plaintiff was entitled to the 
relief prayed for". 
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The Court looked at the facts and evidence be fore it, 
and held: 
Mere inspection and pronunciation dis-
closes that the names of plaintiff and 
defendant are so similar as to speak 
infringement if (a) plaintiff, the con-
ceded prior user of the mark and name 
involved, and defendant, when defendant 
set up its business came into actual 
competition in the same field or terri-
tory of trade, or (b) if defendant, when 
it began business, knowingly assumed 
plaintiff's name and mark in a contigu-
ous field of trade or territory into 
which plaintiff had already penetrated 
with its trade to an extent, and into 
which plaintiff must soon go extensively 
by the natural expansion of its 
business. 
The facts of the two cases are also substantially 
similar, in that the plaintiff in Sweet Sixteen Co. case had 
previously begun operation, altho~gh not on the scale 
eventually contemplated before anything was commenced by the 
defendant, and when defendant did apply to the Secretary of 
State for the use of the name Sweet 16, a letter was sent to 
them advising them of the exclusive right to use of that 
name by Sweet Sixteen Company of San Fr~ncisco, due to its 
prior dealings within the state. Likewise, Mr. Alex George 
had begun business prior to any contemplated establishment 
by the Respondent, and in fact was in the process of 
expandin_g that business when the Respondent came upon the 
scene. Respondent was likewise advised by letter in August, 
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1980, of the prior right to the use of the name by Mr. 
George, but Respondent chose to ignore that fact, and 
continued with its business. Also, the record in both cases 
discloses fairly numerous instances where customers and 
potential customers were misled by the similarity of names 
in mistaking the Respondent's business for that of the 
Appellant. The Court held in Sweet Sixteen: 
The essence of the wrong consists in the 
sale or mistaking of the goods of one 
dealer or manufacturer for those of 
another, and that this was an essential 
e 1 eme n t in bo th c 1 a s s es of cases . In 
fact the common law of trademark is but 
a part of the broader law of unfair 
competition. 
The Court also refers to the case of Qnit~~ ~rug Co. v. 
Theodore Rectanus Co., 39 S.Ct. 48, which held that: 
-------- -------- ---
Undoubtedly the general rule is that, as 
between conflicting claimants to the 
right to use the same mark the fact 
prior appropriation determines the 
question. 
The rationale was that purchasers had come to under-
stand the mark as indicating the origin of what was being 
sold, so that use by a second producer amounts to an attempt 
by the second to sell his goods as those of his competitor. 
In this case, Respondent has seen fit to adopt an almost 
identical type of sign which comes close if it is not, in 
fact, an actual trademark, even though executive officers 
were aware of the existence of Appellant's High Country Club 
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and the signs used in promoting its business, which would 
indicate that they were not wholly innocent of Appellant's 
existence, and its use of the name and mark in controversy, 
bringing into effect the reasoning of the Sweet Sixteen 
case. 
But even more than in the Sweet Sixteen case, the 
Appellant in the present case has been engaged in business 
and purposeful activity since his obtaining of the d/b/a 
from the Secretary of State in 1977. In addition, the 
Appellant has sought to advertise, but because of the con-
fusion of the names used by the parties, is at this point, 
effectively denied the use of the advertising media. 
(R 109-110) 
In the words of the court in Sweet Sixteen: 
p. 415) 
Where the name or device chosen is fanci-
ful or distinctive it may become a 
technical trademark and very slight use 
wil 1, in addition to adopt ion, create a 
trademark. 
And quoting again from ~we~! ~ix!~~~: 
If, however, the courts of a particular 
government can with respect to the 
subject in hand, take cognizance only of 
wrongs committed within the geographical 
boundaries of the country, it is still 
not necessary, in our judgment, that a 
trade in an article should be fully 
established, in the sense that the 
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article be widely known, before the 
proprietor of its trademark or trade 
name may be entitled to the protection 
of courts of equity for the preservation 
of his rights. 
It is further stated: 
A proprietor is entitled to protection 
from the time of commencing the user of 
the trademark. 
Thus, the prior and continued use and registration by 
the High Country Club of the name and trademark on its sign 
was notice to the subsequent appropriators of the name and 
mark of its use and the unauthorized taking over, which was 
in bad faith is therefore compensable through the award of 
damages and also a court acting in equity, should enjoin 
such conduct as being a wrong not countenanced by the law. 
It should be noted that the Legislature of the State of 
Utah has specifically acted to attempt to remedy such 
wrongful appropriation of names by subsequent users by 
providing in 4 2-2-6. 5 of the Utah Code ( 1) : 
The Secretary of State shall not accept 
a certificate for filing if the assumed 
name therein is the same as or decep-
tively similar to the name of ·any cor-
poration authorized to do business in 
this state, a name which is reserved or 
registered in this state pursuant to 
statute, the name of a trademark or 
service mark registered with the 
Secretary, or an assumed name which is 
filed and on the active list. 
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Obviously the Legislature is attempting to prevent the 
very circumstances which occurred in the instant case, but 
apparently the leaving of the matter of accepting names to 
the discretion of clerical staff is not a sufficient 
safeguard, and remedy must be had through the courts to 
prevent the wrongful appropriation, as is evidenced by this 
case. 
Therefore, Appellant is wel 1 within the authority· of 
the case 1 aw in requesting that he be awarded damages for 
the injuries he has suffered, and a permanent injunction 
against further use by the wrongful appropriator, as was 
done in the §we~! ~ix!~~~ case, wherein the court reversed 
11, and remanded with directions to grant to plaintiff the 
releif for which it had prayed. 
CONCLUSION 
The wrongfu 1 appropriation by a subsequent user of a 
name deceptively similar to one already in use and in close 
proximity to the prior appropriator, should be enjoined and 
damages awarded in accordance with widely recognized case 
law dealing with the subject, and the Appellant should be 
granted free and exclusive use of the name which he has 
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properly registered and attempted to preserve through 
exercise of his rights according to the laws of this State. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _j_<i}_ day of June, 19 8 2. 
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP 
. . . .. . . -
PETE-N~-vEXHos-,-5r-the--Pirm-----~ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _j_,.!Jf day of June, 1982, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Brief of Appellant, by placing same in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
MR. ROBERT E. FROERER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
BURTON & FROERER 
536 24th STREET, SUITE 2B 
OGDEN, UT 84401 
(Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent) 
SEC~:!.l.-~~------------
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